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Charles Parkin.
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It is over 160 years since Edmund Burke died in 1797. And yet it
is only now becoming possible to secure a rounded picture of the man.
This new opportunity has come because Burke's papers have just been
made accessible to scholars. After Burke's death his papers-a great mass
of letters, documents, and assorted writings-passed into the hands of
his executors and their successors. The last survivor of these was the
fourth Earl Fitzwilliam. The Fitzwilliam family kept the papers and
withheld them from the public view until 1949. In that year the head
of the Fitzwilliam family turned the papers over to the Public Library
in the city of Sheffield in central England. Additional small holdings of
Burke material have shown up and the stage is now set for a definitive
work on Burke. A new collection of his correspondence is being prepared
by Professor Thomas Copeland of Yale.' New studies of special aspects
of his career are coming out. The four books here being considered are
the latest entrants into this field of scholarship.
Edmund Burke was a leading figure in English political life for
thirty years. He played an important part in issues of immense significance
in the history of western Europe. His writings are an indispensable source
for a full understanding of those issues. Today he is being held up as a
* Attorney, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
The first volume of ten will be published this year by the University of Chicago Press.
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paragon of certain virtues and a source of inspiration for those who feel
the need for a modern philosophy of conservatism. Accordingly, a review
of his life and works will be here presented with the general intention
of pointing to the philosophical and moral issues that present themselves
to anyone who embarks on a study of Burke. Only incidentally will
reference be made to the usefulness of Burke's work for present-day
purposes.
Burke was born in Dublin in 1729. He was Irish, but although his
mother was a Catholic, his father was Protestant and Burke himself was
brought up as an Anglican. It is pertinent to note here that Burke's
wife was a Presbyterian whose father was a Catholic.2 These elements
of Catholicism in his family were used in the political warfare of the day
to accuse Burke of being a Catholic and of having been brought up as a
Jesuit. He uniformly ignored such charges.
In 1744 Burke entered Trinity College in Dublin. He proved to be
an excellent student with a true intellectual zeal. In the spring of 1750
Burke came to London with the intention of studying law. Just five
years later his first important literary effort was published, A Vindication
of Natural Society. The moderate success of this work prompted him to
abandon his law studies. A year later appeared his philosophical study of
the sublime and the beautiful. This too was a success. In April of 1759
David Hume in London wrote to Adam Smith that he had given a copy
of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, to "Burke, an Irish gentleman,
who wrote lately a very pretty treatise on the sublime."'
His next five years were those of a literary hack and hanger-on.
Although a charter member of Johnson's literary club which met every
Monday evening at the Turk's Head,' his worldly progress was not
obvious. Suddenly in July of 1765 Burke became the private secretary
of the Marquis of Rockingham,' who was heading the Whig administration at the time. As a member for a pocket borough "owned" by Lord
Verney, Burke entered Parliament just before Christmas in 1765. The
Rockingham Whigs were dismissed from power in mid-1766 and did
not return again until 1782. A substantial part of Burke's reputation as
2 Stanlis asserts that she was a Catholic. EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 201.
Cone reports the matter to be in dispute with the probability that she was a Protestant.
BURKE AND THE NATURE OF POLITICS, 27.
8 PRIOR, EDMUND BURKE, (5th Ed.) 60.
4CONE, in op. cit., 53.
5"Rockingham possessed rank, wealth, and character, without knowledge, intelligence
or experience." HEARNSHAW, Edmund Burke IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF
SOME REPRESENTATIVE THINKERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA, (ed. by F. J.C. Hearnshaw) 80 (1931). Professor Cone, as usual, is far more charitable. In op. cit., 61 et seq.
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a statesman rests upon the work he did while in opposition during these
sixteen years.
Cone's first volume closes with the resignation of North and his
cabinet on March 20, 1782. Rockingham was his successor. It was a
great day for the Burkes. Edmund became Paymaster of the Forces at
£4000 per annum. And all the other males of the Burke household were
provided for.' Three months later Rockingham died and the party went
out of office. A coalition government was formed and Burke returned.
But this administration lasted only eight months. Thus passed Burke's
only official position. Until the end of his life, these were the only times
when he was on the public payroll. In 1794 Pitt procured for Burke two
Crown annuities worth £2500 which he was able to enjoy for three
years until his death in 1797.
The purpose of this paper is not to recite the varied events of Burke's
life. Professor Cone is devoting two volumes to the details of Burke's
political life. For the time being the most useful work to be done with
respect to Burke will be a striving to understand the intellectual currents
which swirled around him and how he reacted to them. His political
activities will be introduced only where pertinent but our interest will be
directed at his great moments when with a significant issue in hand he set
forth his argument. Strangely enough, his two most important works
were written as pamphlets and were not delivered as speeches. Nevertheless his speaking style in all its ornateness is evident in these works.
A word of digression on Burke's style seems merited. John Morley's opinion seems to reflect the modern attitude:
"Those who have acquired a love for abstract politics amid the almost
mathematical closeness and precision of Hobbes, the philosophic calm of Locke
or Mill, or even the majestic and solemn fervour of Milton, are revolted by the
unrestrained passion and the decorated style of Burke. His passion appears
hopelessly fatal to success in the pursuit of Truth, who does not usually reveal
herself to followers thus inflamed. His ornate style appears fatal to the cautious
and precise method
7 of statement, suitable to matter not known at all unless
known distinctly."

One of the best examples of what Morley is talking about in
Burke's writings is the following description of Burke's reactions to the
insults directed at the French queen:
"I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards
to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry
is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the
glory of Europe is extinguished forever, Never, never more shall we behold
that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified
6 See COPELAND, EDMUND BURKE, SIX EssAYs, 65.

7MORLEY, BURKE 3-4, (1923).
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obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude
itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap
defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, is
gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which
felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity,
and under which vice itself lost half
which ennobled whatever it touched,
its evil, by losing all its grossness.' 8

Before this onslaught, Tom Paine was moved to remark:
"When we see a man dramatically lamenting in a publication intended to
be believed, that, 'The Age of chivalry is gone!, .. .that The unhought grace
of life (if any one knows what it is) . .. is gone!' and all this because the

can we form of his
Quixotic age of chivalric nonsense is gone, what opinion
judgment, or what regard can we pay to his facts?" 9

Our modern reaction to Burke's torrent would be that it was only
an emotional outburst. But the recent revival of interest in Burke has
produced at least Russell Kirk who has striven mightily to give a meaning
to phrases of Burke such as the one just quoted. For example, he declares
that
"Burke employs this idea of the unbought grace of life to describe the
great civilizing and ordering influence of a liberal mind, in the old and true
of
sense of the word 'liberal'-that is, the disciplined reason and imagination
10
free men, which were the product of the education of a gentleman."

It is not shameful that Burke's exact meaning is not always clear.
It is a fact. The passion he is expressing is usually obvious. Nothing is
to be gained by straining to make something out of what is not there.
But a full evaluation of Burke should consider that this great master of
English at times went on for a considerable stretch without really saying
anything.
Another charge which a biographer should face up to is that it can
be demonstrated that Burke's factual basis for his arguments frequently
was erroneous when it was not deliberately imaginary. Let us examine
this problem at once. Turning away from this digression on Burke's style,
it may be noted that near the beginning of Burke's political career he
chose to set forth his theory of party government. He did so in a
pamphlet which is usually described as a masterpiece. As will be seen,
the basis for the praise is open to question.
The Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents was, according to Cone, "the first major attempt to explain the nature and the utility,
8 Reflections on the Revolution in France, WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE (Bohn. Ed.)

II, 348.

9 THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE, (ed. by Win. M. Van der Weyde, (1925)

VI, 35.0

. KIRK, A PROGRAM FOR CONSERVATIVES, 52.
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even the necessity of political parties." Of this work, Cone states: "certain portions of the pamphlet, dedicated to an analysis of political conditions in 1770, have meaning only for historical specialists. But other
sections of it will remain relevant as long as political freedom exists.""
That first sentence is never explained by the author and deserves
some consideration. An entire school of British historians have denounced
as fantastic Burke's description of the structure of English politics during
the early years of the reign of George III. This controversy goes to the
heart of Professor Cone's book. Professor Cone has deliberately put off
discussion of Burke's political philosophy until a future volume discusses
Burke's writings on the French Revolution. This first volume therefore
discusses Burke "as a party politician."' 2 But when one merely uses a
word like "party" with reference to the long reign George III, the
controversy is ignited anew. The issues should not be ignored. I think
Professor Cone has explained the matters at issue in a moderate mannerbut without any indication that there are other solutions which are
markedly different from those advanced by him and by Burke. An
attempt will be made to give at least a suggestion of what is at issue.
In 1765 when Burke entered the House of Commons, Professor
Cone believes that there was a system of political parties in existence in
England. It was a loose two-party arrangement. The King still retained
the power of choice over his ministers. The support for these ministers
came from the Tories or the King's Friends. Cone does not use the former
term very often. The latter name is the one popularized by Burke. The
Whigs in opposition were divided into segments each of which gave
personal allegiance to leading members of the landed aristocracy, such
as, the Earl of Chatham or the Marquis of Rockingham."3 But, according
to Professor Cone, only the Rockingham Whigs ever developed into a
political party. This came about through the efforts of Burke who gave
to this group a set of coherent beliefs and by his efforts and personal
prodding held them together during all the years they were in opposition.
Through all these years in the wilderness, Burke kept trying to develop
a consistent program for the Rockinghams. His biggest task appears to
have been to persuade his leader to come to London and attend sessions
of Parliament. It was out of this experience that Burke wrote his Thoughts
on the Cause of the Present Discontents.
11 CONE, in op. Cit., 195.

Id. at vi.
Is "The Rockingham party in 1765 cannot possibly have exceeded a hundred" PARES,
KING GEORGE III AND THE POLITICIANS, 206 (1953).
12
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Having given a general view of Cone's position, the next step will
be a more extended statement of Burke's views on the nature of politics
in England in 1770. One question raised by this study should certainly
be to inquire why Cone believes that such material has meaning only for
historical specialists. I suggest this study to be of the utmost importance
to biographers of Burke.
In the Bohn edition of Burke's works, the Thoughts fill 75 pages."
The purpose of the pamphlet was to ask and answer the question: What
is the cause of the present discontent with the Government? It is customary to complain about the times, but the complaining at the present
time (1770) is more pointed than usual. There is no merit in any complaint that the people are at fault. "The people have no interest in disorder." The people today feel a discontent but they have not as yet put
their finger on it. The reason is that the trouble has arisen from an
unexpected source. "The power of the Crown, almost dead and rotten
as Prerogative, has grown up anew, . . . under the name of Influence."'"
In order that the Crown's power may be absolute it has even attempted
to humble and discredit its own ministry. The court had the long range
policy of destroying the great Whig connections which were possessed
of an enduring natural influence. The device adopted to undermine the
ministry was the creation of "a cabal of the closet and back-stairs" which
would take the place of the national administration. The members of
this group were united only in their devotion to the King. They were
the King's men.' 6
This state of affairs is contrary to past practice. Since the Revolution
of 1689, "the influence of the crown had been always employed in
supporting the ministers of state, and in carrying on the public business
according to their opinions."1 These opinions, Burke claims, "should all
be exercised upon public principles and national grounds, and not on
the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a court."' " For this
reason a system of favoritism is unnatural. The device of "the double
cabinet" is designed to undermine the principles and the practice of the
administration. The very basis of the British government requires that
the views and opinions of the administration correspond to those of the
legislature. This conclusion obviously requires Burke to believe in the
existence in Burke's time of a fully developed theory of cabinet responsibility.
14 BURKE'S WORKS, I, 306-81.
15 WORKS, I, 313.

i Id. at 320.

17 Id. at 324.

's Id.at 331.
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The historical claim is then put forward by Burke that: "It had
always, until of late, been held the first duty of parliament to refuse to
support government, until power was in the hands of persons who were
acceptable to the people, or while factions predominated in the court in
which the nation had no confidence."'" To Burke, it therefore followed
that if the control by the Commons over the persons who became members of the administration were to be lost, all was lost. This responsibility
of the administration to Parliament insured that a class of men would
be ministers who had some connection with and support of the people.
At any rate, their sole claim to fame would not be the King's favor.
This new system of aggrandizing the crown has not been in anyone's
interest. The method adopted has discredited us abroad, the people at
home are uneasy, the King himself is certainly experiencing no tranquility. But probably most important of all, the House of Commons appears
to be forfeiting its prerogatives. "The virtue, spirit, and essence of a
House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings
of the nation."2 The best example that this virtue and spirit was being
lost may be found in the voiding of the election of John Wilkes elected
to Parliament from Middlesex County. If the Commons dares do this,
it does not appear to be amenable to the wishes of the people. A Commons thus unconnected with the people has been the objective of the
King's men. They needed one additional item and they have now gotten
that-a Civil List which is not confined to the annual appropriations.
Servile Parliaments have gotten into the habit of making up deficiencies
in the King's expenditures without demanding explanations nor seeking
promises of reform.
To correct these conditions, mere structural changes in the manner
or times of holding parliamentary sessions will not avail. The answer
lies with the members of the Commons themselves. "When bad men
combine, the good must associate . .."1 The good must unite to defeat
the cabal. They cannot run away from their duty to restore honor to
political life. The answer to the nation's ills is the rebirth of a true party
spirit. "Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint
endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which
they are all agreed .... It is the business of the speculative philosopher
to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the

19

ld. at 333. (Burke's italics)

20d.at 348.
211d. at 372.
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politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means
towards those ends, and to employ them with effect."2
According to Burke, the only effective political action is through
parties. A party standing solid could refuse to deal with any administration having King's men in its ranks. And if itself was in office, it could
reject membership of placemen. Everything turns on the men you are
dealing with. Honorable men may differ but remain united. A careful
selection of one's company in the beginning of one's political life is the
important thing. The choice having been made, loyalty and moderation
will carry one forward united with those of like mind. And, Burke concludes, now is the time for such unity.
I think it possible to accept Burke's principles in this pamphlet as a
general expression of the underlying theory of political party in the Great
Britain of the late nineteenth century. However, there is a school of
modern British historians whose specialty is eighteenth century British
politics who vigorously insist that Burke's theory of party had no application to the ministries of George III and, further, that his factual basis
was almost totally imaginative.
Sir Lewis Namier calls the concept of a double cabinet "a product
of Burke's fertile, disordered and malignant imagination."2 Namier has
further represented the party picture in one sentence. "In 1761 not one
parliamentary election was determined by party, and in 1951 not one
constituency returned a non-party member."'"
The problem of parties is bound up with the sovereign. There is in
Cone's work no close discussion of George III. It was the King's personal
government that Burke was striking at. And yet the verdict of the historians has been that the King was acting within his constitutional rights
and was on far sounder historical and constitutional grounds than Burke.2 '
This is not the place to expand on this controversy. But it is pertinent to note the existence of such a difference of opinion with respect to
221d. at 375-76.
25 NAMIER, PERSONALITIES AND POWERS.

21 (1955). Cone calls it "sheer nonsense." In op. cit., 202 "The truth is that in 1760-61 George IlImost ardently desired to
see the man in office to whom he would have given the fullest confidence that any monarch
has ever given to a Prime Minister; . ..and that after he had found his Newcastle in
Lord North (that very year 1770 in which Burke published the pamphlet .. .) he supported him loyally ....There never was a deliberate system of 'double cabinets' as sketched
by Burke in a polemical pamphlet . . . which has been often treated as if it were an
impartial verdict on George III." NAMIER, ENGLAND IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 182 (1930). "There is little .. . to justify Burke's fanciful picture.
DODD,24 THE GROWTH OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 125 (1956).
NAMIER, PERSONALITIES AND POWERS, 14.
25 See PARES, KING GEORGE III AND THE POLITICIANS, passim
MONARCHY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM (1952).

(1953); NAMIER,

19581
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Burke. It can be agreed that the pamphlet was for political purposes. 2" Its
asserted factual basis was not accurate. Its theory of party had no audible
supporters among Burke's colleagues. The theory of cabinet responsibility
which he asserted to have existed in England in fact for decades in the
past actually did not become the practice until well into the 19th century.
Burke's ideal of party does not prevail today in British or American
circles. With the mass electorates, parties are invariably coalitions and
do not represent any particular principle. Is not this a strange affair? If
this is one of the greatest of Burke's works, we may well ask whether
they are all so constructed? Professor Cone does not raise this question.
I would raise a related question: What is the significance of the pamphlet?
Is it what, of another phase of Burke's work, Robert Hutchins called "a
series of specious arguments, rhetorical flourishes, and quotable lines"?" '
On this most significant aspect of Burke's work on the nature of politics,
I cannot agree that Burke had any significant influence on the course of
cabinet government in Great Britain. Burke's influence on. political
theory must be proven specifically and not just asserted. Whoever
undertakes the proof must head straight into the works of Namier, Pares,
and a very tight knit set of historians who do not seem to hold Burke
in very high esteem.
If we are to extol Burke's efforts to make the ministry responsible
to the Commons, we should be greatly interested in Dunning's Resolution of April 6, 1780. The resolution stated: "That the influence of the
Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished." Professor Cone states that Dunning carried the burden of supporting the
resolution. He adds: "with the government taken off balance, Burke
and his friends remained silent.. ."" The authority on this period asks:
"Why was it so much Dunning's debate-why from Fox, Burke, Savile,
Barre, and Lord John Cavendish was there no great speech?""
In this consideration of Burke's pamphlet Thoughts on the Cause
of the PresentDiscontents, it has been noted that opinion among the specialists is that the factual basis of the pamphlet is just fantasy. Things
just never were as Burke reports them.
We find the same reaction of students when we come to Burke's
greatest work, the Reflections on the Revolution in France, published in
November of 1790. Starting with Tom Paine, the critics and students of
Burke agree that Burke had no solid grasp of actual conditions in France.
28 CONE, in op. cit. 202. Stanlis describes the pamphlet as Burke's "early masterpiece."
In op. cit., 50.
27 Hutchins, The Theory of the State: Edmund Burke, 5 REV. OF POL. 139, 155 (1943).
28 CONE, in op. cit., 374.
29
BUTTERFIELD, GEORGE III, LORD NORTH, AND THE PEOPLE, 1779-80 318 (1949).
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This alleged ignorance was the foundation upon which Paine wrote The
Rights of Man. But more disinterested writers agree with the charge.
Hearnshaw states the usual view when he remarks that: "keenly as
we may be aware of the inadequacy of Burke's Reflections as a scientific
explanation of the epoch-making events which they surveyed, we are
none the less impressed by the unerring instinct which detected the true
and world-wide significance of the phenomena [which he observed] ...
while still the King was on the throne, and ere yet the Terror had begun,
he foretold the republic, the proscription, the anarchy, the war, and the
final military dictatorship."" Cobban notes: "Admitting, however, the
inadequacy of his estimate of the origins of the movement and the irrationality of his motives. It still remains true that Burke grasped with surprising justness the spirit of those men who in the natural course were
enabled to arrogate to themselves the leadership of the Revolution."31
If the argument is made that Burke's attitude towards the French
Revolution is emotional rather than rational, it should be of interest to
know that other reasons are advanced for Burke's uncompromising antipathy towards the French Revolution. Tom Paine accused him of being
a secret Crown pensioner in 1790. Harold Laski asserts that "No one
can read through his private letters without a sense that he was overawed
by rank not seldom to the detriment of his judgment. Particularly when
he writes to emigres of high birth, he seems to be composing on his
knees. Obviously, too, he was a man of emotions so profound that, when
they were deeply touched, the rationalism that appears so striking in his
analysis of the American Revolution deserts him completely."32
A third reason is a very simple one that has been adopted by some
important historians. Henry Thomas Buckle calmly asserts that Burke's
mind broke before the awesome spectacle of the French Revolution."3
The Burke scholar, Thomas Copeland, admits that the sanity of Burke
in his final years is a question to be taken seriously by all students and
biographers of Burke."' Professor Copeland gives several examples from
Burke's writings of which the least that can be said is that Burke sounds
like a paranoic.
In the course of this essay there will be other occasions to note
Burke's deficiencies in knowledge and judgment. This is clearly a strange
charge to level at a man to whom history and experience were the most
80 HEARNSHAW,in
121.

op. cit.,
86-7.

81 COBBAN, EDMUND BURKE AND THE REVOLT AGAINST THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY,
32

LETTERS OF BURKE (ed. by Laski) xiv-xv.
HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND, I,
84 COPELAND, EDMUND BURKE, Six ESSAYS, 88 et seq.

83 BUCKLE,

334 et seq. (1885).
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potent tests of reality. The point is so important in considering the significance of Burke that it deserves some sharper discussion and whatever
clarification may be possible. The defects in his knowledge of fact on
crucial issues has already been considered. Let us now turn to the alleged
inconsistencies in his judgment.
Most writers who discuss the general moral or philosophical views
of Burke take a position on the score of Burke's consistency over thirty
years of active political life. Superficially, one can argue either way.
Inconsistency can be demonstrated by showing that from 1770 to 1789
Burke was the Great Whig who fought for the freedom of the Americans
and the Irish, who opposed the influence of the King in parliamentary
government, and who attacked the tyranny of the East India Company
in India. Suddenly in 1789 a new menace appeared and the first and
greatest of the modern conservatives set forth views in opposition to the
French Revolution that branded him as, in Namier's phrase, a "counterrevolutionary Tory."" George III could not stand the thought of Burke
until the appearance of the Reflections which he promptly recommended
as a book that ought to be read by every gentleman."
One form of consistency can be worked out by a careful and selective definition of words. A recent writer has noted that Burke even seemed
to be both a revolutionary and a conservative at the same time."7 But this
is explained by semantics. Burke was for reform and correction but
opposed to innovation and change. This writer explains that "The guide
to Burke's mind in this matter should be the distinction between a
change in substance and an improvement in exteriors." 8
In these terms, revolution in America would return to the colonists
their ancient rights. Such was the basis of Burke's approval of the
Glorious Revolution of 1689 which gave back to the whole people their
liberty. However, the French Revolution of 1789 was not a general
revolt but was an assault of one class, the lower orders, upon the upper
classes and the established government. Its primary objective therefore
could not be conservation but was directed at a completely new order.
Professor Mazlish is led to remark that Burke's words in condemning the
French Revolution were so broad in scope that "the public and other
35 Hearnshaw divides Burke's life into three periods. The second, 1765-89, is "the
period of advocacy of reform" and the third, 1789-97, is "the period of opposition to revolution." HHARNSHAW, in op. ctit. (n. 5, supra) at 76. Burke had to face this same charge
of inconsistency in his own lifetime. See An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,
(1791),
WORKS, III, I.
8
6 PRIOR, LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE, (5th ed.) 313.
87 Mazlish, The Conservative Revolution of Edmund Burke, 20 REv. OF POL. 21
(1958).
88ld. at 31.
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publicists overlooked his restraining remarks and condemned all revoM
lutions.""
A contrary view is given by Robert Hutchins who feels very strongly.
that the beginning and end of Burke's career are irreconcilable. Hutchins
finds the trouble to be in Burke's fatal weakness for theorizing with
dazzling but unconvincing effect." He demonstrates this by analyzing
Burke's theory of the state of various stages in his career. In his early
works on Ireland, Burke found a simple test by which to measure the
extent to which the state promoted the happiness of the people. If it
failed to provide for the welfare of the people, resistance was warranted.
The American revolt was justified because it was to recover ancient rights
which Parliament was voiding. An Eternal Justice supported Burke's
attack upon Warren Hastings for the latter's misdeeds in India. In these
three cases, Hutchins holds that Burke admitted that original rights of
the people will supersede the law and that the people may resist the
Government where these rights are not recognized or are ignored."
Hutchins then turns to Burke's views on France. His general comment is that: "The violently emotional character of Burke's expressions
on this subject makes it difficult to take his theoretical arguments seriously .... All we know with certainty is that the French had no cause
to revolt and that whereas taxation without representation justified the
Americans in throwing off the British yoke by force of arms, the mildness
of the French King and the beauty of his Queen made the moderate
constitutional reform of 1789 a flagrant violation of all the laws of
nature, man, and God."' 2
Now, however, since the state is a work of nature, revolution becomes
an unnatural act. Virtue, reason, and the common good have become
identified with the positive law of the established order so that the right
to resist has so shrunken that Hutchins concludes that: "Where once a
tax on tea
sanctified resistance, now only plans of inhuman butchery will
8
suffice.'
Burke's views on the social contract indicate that he had finally
arrived at the view of a social order in which all natures were in their
appointed place. There can, of course, be no change from this divinely
established order. We are thus brought to the position that after the
French Revolution, Burke had reached the view that: "everything stopped
yesterday. The presumption that the people want the government they
39Id.

at 32.

The Theory of the State: Edmund Burke, 5 REV.

40 Hutchins,

41 Id. at 144.
421d. at 145.

43Id. at 146.

OF POL. 139 (1943).
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have can be invoked before a revolution but not after it. A new prescriptive period cannot begin to run; it was wrong to interrupt the
old one. Convention in the sense of convenience applies to protect old
interests but not new ones. . . .The will of God ceased to operate constructively when the society was given its original constitution. A new
constitution must therefore come into being against His will.""
Hutchins then relates how Burke's condemnation of the French
Revolution forced him to contort his position with respect to the Irish
and the Americans. His summation on Burke's theory of the State is
harsh:
"In discussing the theory of the state Burke developed, not so much a philosophy of conservatism, for a philosophy is a reasoned and coherent view of
the universe or some aspect of it, as a series of specious arguments, rhetorical
flourishes, and quotable lines which Tories of all later generations have hurled
at the heads of those who sought social improvement. At the last God, man,
and nature conspire, except in Ireland, to keep things as they are. The singularly static society which emerges is as contrary to fact as it is to any sound
conception of the state.
"Why did a man of Burke's impressive abilities abandon an intelligible
and defensible theory for the dazzling nonsense of his later years? The answer
must be that whereas he wanted the Americans to be independent, and whereas
he wanted Warren Hastings convicted, he wanted the Bourbons restored in
France and the movement for reform halted in England. He fashioned his
theories to serve the purpose he had in view. Contrary 4 to
the advice he offered
5
the world, he made his reason subordinate to his will."

When one turns, however, to those writers whose primary interests
are not historical or political, there seems to be no difficulty in finding
Burke wholly consistent in his views. Charles Parkin, while attempting
to state the full range of Burke's moral thought, chose to draw his
extracts from the entire corpus of Burke's published writings and recorded utterances. In discussing Burke's views he makes no effort to
date them. Parkin acknowledges the span of years covered by these
utterances, he recognizes the ephemeral and practical origin of the situations which gave rise to the remarks. Yet he holds that it was Burke's
lifelong habit to respond to human affairs under the guidance of moral
principles. Accordingly, he says that in his book: "Burke's writings and
utterances have ... been treated not as a sequence of political attitudes
and ideas, but as an assemblage of moral statement and assertion, to be
articulated and reconciled within itself."" Parkin justifies his practice
by saying that: "If Burke's political actions and ideas derive from settled
moral convictions, as he claims, it is at this level that his wholeness and
consistency must be assessed."
44Id.at
45
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This consistency in terms of moral principles is borne out by most
students who have examined Burke's work at this level. Harold Laski
states that a complete edition of Burke's correspondence "would prove,
if proof be needed, the consistency of his principles no less than the
amazing accuracy of his insight."'"
A final writer well qualified to judge, Leo Strauss, testifies that,
even admitting that Burke spoke only for particular and practical purposes, a charge of inconsistency cannot be levelled against him. He
states of Burke that: "A single faith animated his actions in favor of the
American colonists, in favor of the Irish Catholics, against Warren Hastings, and against the French Revolution."' 8
In this general introduction to the subject of Edmund Burke, considerable emphasis has been placed on the problem of consistency in
dealing with Burke's writings. It was clear that throughout his life Burke
had approached problems of government and politics as though they
were moral problems. The solution of such problems had to be derived
from moral principles or they were not acceptable solutions. Where
Burke is criticized is in the conclusions he arrives at after applying these
principles. There is not too much to be gained by complaining about
Burke's reaction to the French Revolution. That reaction is now but one
more historical fact. What has continued to live are the moral principles
that Burke used as the basis for his rejection of this great social movement. It was noted that if there is support for Burke's consistency of purpose and argument, it will arise out of his proposing certain moral principles for application to the various practical problems that faced him
throughout his career.
Despite this argument, the initial reaction to Charles Parkin's book
is that he must be straining at times to make the moral beliefs of Burke
perfectly consistent, especially since he draws upon Burke's writings over
his entire career. After having now been over Parkin's book several
times, I am satisfied that it all works out. It sounds like Burke would
have sounded, if Burke had taken the trouble to clarify himself. The
heart, then, of Burke is this solid core of moral beliefs that guided him
throughout his career. I should like to discuss some of these beliefs by
the simple means of stating them and pointing to some critical problems
raised by them.
This essay is being written without much obvious assistance from
the works of Peter Stanlis and Charles Parkin. My intention is merely
to provide an introductory survey of the area covered by Burke's mind.
47 LETTERS OF EDMUND BURKE, A SELECTION (ed. by Harold
'i STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 295 (1953).
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The two authors mentioned cover this same ground in meticulous fashion,
each in his own way. After the essay proper is finished I shall discuss
each of the four books which were the original excuse for this effort. But
I would like to note here that Messrs. Parkin and Stanlis have produced
two much-needed and welcome additions to a surprisingly scanty bibliography on Edmund Burke.
Returning now to our main theme, the first, and probably the most
important principle, which guided Burke's thoughts was the belief that
the actions of men and governments are regulated by law. And mere
man-made law must bow before a natural law of divine origin. To
enter into any extended discussion of natural law would be folly. The
literature on the subject is unbelievable in its immensity and, it might be
added, in the intensity of both its adherents and of those who deny its
very existence. The question that is of interest in this essay is the place of
Burke, in the mainstream of the history of natural law in Western
Europe,4" or even more particularly, in England.
Natural law is a doctrine running through the intellectual history
of Europe. Its origins are visible in Socrates. More fully developed by
Roman writers such as Cicero, it reached its flowering among the Schoolmen. To take the best example, for Aquinas there are three kinds of
law: Divine, natural, and human." The Divine law is the eternal law
insofar as it represents the Idea of the government of things by God, the
Ruler of the Universe. Since all things subject to Divine providence are
ruled and measured by the eternal law "it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as... from its being imprinted
on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and
ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine
providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share
of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper "act and end: and this participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature is called the natural law."" The human law consists of particular determinations arrived at by the use of human reason.
Although guided by the precepts of natural law, " St. Thomas anticipates
that the results will be imperfect.
49 Ernest Barker in his translation of Otto's Gierke's Natural Law and The Theory of
Society, 1500 to 1800, points out (p. xi) that Gierke nowhere mentions Hooker, Paine, or
Burke.
50 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Par. I, II, Q 91.
51Id., Q 91, Art. 2.
52
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In a subsequent section, " St. Thomas considers natural law in more
detail. One significant point there discussed is the conclusion of Aquinas
that natural law may not be the same for all men. The knowledge and
truth of natural law is the same for all men "but as to certain matters
of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of more general principles,
it is the same for all in the majority of cases.... ; and yet in some few
cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles ...
and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion,
or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft,
although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered
wrong among the Germans."'"
This was natural law in Europe until another age with other problems used the phrase for its own purposes. The classical theory of natural
law was an ethical theory based on religion. The sixteenth century produced upheavals that called for a reordering of men's thoughts on the
secular problems of politics and government. The phrase "natural law"
was seized upon for this purpose. For our present interest in British
thought, Hobbes is the perfect example of this movement. " Hobbes'
intention, following the fall of the Stuarts, was to work out a theory of
sovereignty that would force all subjects to recognize their legal obligation to obey their sovereign. In his chief work, the Leviathan, Hobbes
set forth a theory of a state of nature. It was a dreadful place where life
was "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." 6 In order to be relieved
of this sort of life, primitive man allegedly entered into a contract
whereby they agreed to place a sovereign over all of them and place upon
him the duty of providing the personal security, that each now spent his
life providing for himself. In return for this security, the men in the civil
society would obey the commands of this sovereign."
In the original state of nature there were laws of nature. Hobbes
states that "A Law of nature . . . is a Precept, or general Rule, found
out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same ... .
Hobbes then enumerates over twenty laws of nature. They all deal with
various aspects of the problem of personal security. Obviously, natural
law is being used in a different context from that of Aquinas.
531d.,
5'Id.,

Q 94.
Q 94, Art. 4.

55 For those concerned with natural law in England, Hobbes is taken as the founder
of modern natural right theory. See STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGIT AND HISTORY, Chap. V.
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The next entrant into the line of English political thought is John
Locke. Locke, like Hobbes, had a peculiar political problem and his
solution was tailored to solve that problem. In his second treatise on
civil government, he discusses the state of nature. He says: "The state of
nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in
his life, liberty or possessions.""
This offshoot from classical natural law led on to Rousseau, Tom
Paine, and the French Revolution. Its emphasis was on the individual
and his personal rights. Its ethical sanction inevitably is based on the
pleasure of the individual. The standard of justice will be formulated
after considering the well-being of the individuals. It was this entire line
of thought that Burke is attempting to throw back in the Reflections.
As Leo Strauss notes, Burke used the language of modern natural right:
"He spoke of the state of nature, of the rights of the nature or of the
rights of man, and of the social compact or of the artificial character of
the commonwealth. But he may be said to integrate these nations into
a classical or Thomistic framework.""0
The concept of nature was much used by the eighteenth century
thinkers for purposes of orienting a secular society. It is therefore to be
expected that Burke would use the term. In the Middle Ages, the Law of
Nature was a controlling or regulating force imposed from on high. In
the so-called Age of Reason, it became a liberating principle available
to individuals."' It was this latter view that Burke found repellent.
Impregnated as it is with natural law, it follows that every tenet of
Burke's philosophy had its roots in a religious soil. Burke said that
"Religion is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good and of
all comfort." 2 As a consequence he said he was proud that the English
people thought so highly of a national religious establishment. English
education was conducted in accordance with this religion. Probably the
most important rule that Burke would propose for statesmen is that: "All
persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully
impressed with an idea that they act in trust and that they are to account
for their conduct in that trust to the one great Master, Author, and
Founder of society."63
59 LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 119 (Everyman's Ed.).
60
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Stanlis has an excellent chapter on the relation between Church
and State in Burke's thought, excellent in the sense that it brings together
in one place Burke's thoughts on the matter. But like much of the book,
the chapter lacks an essential precision of thought. For instance, Stanlis
says "In modes of worship, as well as in doctrines, Burke was essentially
Catholic."" There is little evidence for this statement. Burke was a man
profoundly moved by religious feeling. Religion was ancient, continuous,
moderate, peaceful, and virtuous. Such was society. Men lived and died
in such an atmosphere. To change the conditions of life to reject any of
these elements was abhorrent to him. But nothing here implies any
intellectual or doctrinal content. There is no evidence that he had any
strictly theological interests at all. There is a difference between an Anglican and a Catholic, and we must insist that Burke was an Anglican and
not a Catholic. A sympathy for victims of immoderate intolerance allows
no inference of sympathy for the doctrines of the affected people.
This religious base for his philosophy is almost sufficient explanation
for Burke's reaction from the moral and political philosophies of his own
times. His reaction has been explained however in various ways. One
writer entitles his book, Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the
Eighteenth Century." To Parkin, Burke's reaction is to the abstract
idealism of the French Revolution. To other writers, Burke is attacking
John Locke's influence.6" All of these approaches have the same result
and their consequences can be explained in the same manner. Since this
reaction of Burke appears to be the central point of study about him, we
shall discuss issues in these theoretical areas which were the object of
Burke's attack.
Before entering into an extended consideration of the social and
political concepts used by Burke, a word should be said about Burke and
philosophy. Burke was a philosopher only in the sense that he was
thoughtful and could deal in concepts. Nowhere does he close in a professional manner with the traditional problems of philosophy. As far as
we know from Burke's own writings, Hume was primarily an historian.
German philosophy was still unknown in England. " Burke's early biographer, James Prior, has a few interesting remarks to make on Burke and
philosophy. He tells of Burke's studies at Trinity, at which time his
4I op. cit., 202.
5By Alfred Cobban (London, 1929).
66 Einaudi, The British Background of Burke's Political Philosophy, 46 Pol. Sci. Q. 576
(1934).
67 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was published in 1781 but nobody in England in the
late 18th century knew German. 'In those days philosophy in Great Britain was pretty
well confined to the Scottish Professors" Stephen, Studies of a Biographer, II, 47.
6
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favorite subjects "were classics, history, philosophy, general literature,
and from a speculative turn of mind, a pretty strong attachment to metaphysics; at least so far as they go toward clearing the judgment and
strengthening the understanding, but no further. This pursuit he afterwards relinquished, convinced, as he said, that it was of doubtful utility,
8
tending neither to make man better nor happier, but rather the reverse.
It is not certain whether this observation is the thought of the
biographer or his subject. At any rate, according to Prior, philosophy
remained for Burke the "queen of arts, and daughter of heaven." In 1752
he even entertained the idea of seeking the professorship of logic at the
University of Glasgow. The post had just been vacated by Francis Hutcheson. To prepare himself for this task: "he laid in, in addition to an
unusually ample stock of general knowledge, a large adventure in metaphysics,-no less than a refutation of the systems of his own countrymen
the celebrated Berkeley, and of Hume." 9
All this may sound slightly amateurish. But a few years after the
above events, Burke published A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin
0 Whatever its faults, this was
of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful."
not the work of a complete amateur. It is notable among Burke's writings
in its striving for verbal precision.
These remarks are background for a discussion of Burke's lifelong
struggle against those who would decide the affairs of men on the basis
of metaphysical abstractions. To our way of thinking Burke is as "abstract" as any of his opponents. It does not hurt to understand that
Burke deals in principles; his opponents, in abstractions. 7' But we can
sympathize with his effort to avoid testing human affairs by non-empirical
criteria. Our only question today would be whether what he considered
to be experience and history was any more empirical than the theories
of those he denounced. Burke viewed conscious intellectual effort as entirely inadequate for arriving at the truth of political and social matters.
A concrete or higher reason embodied not only the conclusions of the
individual intellect but also the collective wisdom of the ages. It grew
out of history and reflected the ancient social order. These few sentences
only hint at Burke's theory of knowledge. Special studies need to be
made in the most rigorous terms of Burke's theory of what and how
6

8 PRIOR, LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE
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we know. This and similar studies would have to go beyond the analysis
of Parkin. They should be both historical and critical. Ultimately we
shall want to do more than just try to understand the bare meaning of
Burke's sentences. Studies like these have not yet begun to appear.
The ultimate problems of philosophy are visible in the matters
discussed by Burke. For instance, Cobban points out that Burke opposed
the psychology of Locke which seemed to admit the reality only of things
of immediate perception. Locke's psychology posited an infant having
a clean slate of a mind with the capability of picking up all varieties
of sense impression.
For Burke this approach would exclude from politics "the whole
field of tradition, the whole work of the genius of the race."' Heredity
and history would count for nothing. Man must be more than a blank
sheet at birth.
The eighteenth century, in its efforts at self-analysis, found nothing
to be an improper subject for speculation and practical solution. For
instance, a favorite subject was the primitive origins of man and his
transition from the state of nature to civil society by way of the Social
Compact. In the previous discussion on natural law, we have seen how
Hobbes diverted the course of natural law and found his variety of
natural law to arise out of an assumed state of nature. Rousseau changed
the quality of this primitive society. But Burke would have none of it in
any form. He could not conceive of a primeval society in which there
was no law or custom. Burke recognized the existence of a Social Contract. These are his words:
"Society is indeed a contract ....
but the state ought not to be considered
as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee,
calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little
temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to
be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things
subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable
nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership
in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who
are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state
is but a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the
lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and the invisible world,
according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which
holds all
7
physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place." '

Most of the commentators have their opinion of this passage.
Hearnshaw says that: "If one asks what is the meaning of this sonorous
7
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passage, the answer is that as it stands it has none. It is resounding nonsense. . . . the emptiest verbiage. . . . language has obviously lost its
ordinary meaning."'" And yet, as even Hearnshaw points out, the passage does convey at least an emotion. It reflects Burke's rejection of Locke
but it is a rejection in which Locke's words are used. Locke's legalisms are
lost. Out of the ashes of Locke's contract arises a new concept of an
organism called the State.
Parkin quotes this section in full"6 and has no difficulty in finding
it in accord with the higher moral aspirations of Burke. Parkin recognizes that this particular passage has been criticized as a rejection or perversion of the conventional Contract view, but he finds no merit in this
argument. He points out that Locke's preoccupation was with the limitations of political authority. Burke's emphasis is upon the higher law
which governs all society and political authority. Parkin is aware that
Burke is looking back to the natural law theorists who antedate Hobbes,
but he does not consider this historical problem in any critical sense nor
does he explain Burke's historical purposes. His sole purpose to explain
and make consistent Burke's own words.
Burke's view of the Compact effectively rejects any claim that government is an artificial creation of men, created by them through some
sort of mutual agreement. The State has a real vitality of its own but
not divorced from the individuals who compose it. This theory of the
state as an organism is never fully developed by Burke. When the more
difficult aspects of the theory intrude they are pushed aside by references
to an awesome deity or other mysterious influences.
Society and government are the work of Providence. The origins
or creation of the structure may be lost in time. But we know the instruments by which the continuity of society is maintained. Burke variously
refers to them as tradition, prescription, prejudice, and custom. Russell
Kirk attempts to define some of these terms as he believes Burke would
have defined them. Prescription is "the customary right which grows out
of the conventions and compacts of many successive generations." Prejudice is "the half-intuitive knowledge that enables men to meet the problems of life without logic-chopping."" A few pages earlier Kirk had
defined prejudice as "the answer with which intuition and ancestral consensus of opinion supply a man when he lacks either time or knowledge to
arrive at a decision predicated upon pure reason." '
75 HEARNsHAw, in op. cit., 93.
76 PARKIN, in op. cit., 23.
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78 Id.at 34.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VII

With these definitions in mind we can understand Burke when he

states: "We are generally men of untaught feelings; . . . instead of
casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them
because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more
generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid
to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason;
because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages."7
A man holding such a belief would obviously be repelled by people
who believed that man's present nature could be scrapped and that he
could then be started off in another direction. In short, the innovators
were attempting the impossible. A new way of life was blocked by the
elements of continuity which made the state. Accordingly, because of
the continuity in the life of the state, because it reflects higher purposes,
and finally because of the continuing presence of the natural law, Burke
rejects a doctrine that modern lawyers are quite familiar with. Parkin
quotes Burke as follows: "It would be hard to point out any error more
truly subversive of all order and beauty, of all the peace and happiness,
of human society, than the position, that any body of men have a right
to make what laws they please; or that "laws can derive any authority
from their institution merely and independent of the quality of the subject-matter. ' °
In Burke's description of the Social Compact, he stated his view
that there was a natural social order that establishes natural rights and
duties. Subsequent acts of sovereigns must be in accord with that order
or such laws are subversive of society. Contrary to Hobbes, a law is
not a law simply because it is commanded. A law must accord with the
natural order, or presumably, it is not law. In our constitutional background, American law has seen much of this concept of a higher law.
The pendulum has swung for the present and the doctrine of "judicial
restraint" is regnant.
Considerations of law raise the question of legal rights. The typical
eighteenth century theorist would have it that inhering in man's nature
were certain rights. These rights tended in the direction of what was
called liberty and progress. To Burke however they were egalitarian and
subversive.
79Reflections,
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Men in society have rights. They also have duties. And the two are
so inseparable that Burke gives them the same name-'the real rights of
men." He asserts that "If civil society be made for the advantage of man,
all the advantages for which it is made become his right. It is an institution of beneficence; and law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule.
Men have a right [duty] to live by that rule; they have a right [duty]
They have a right to the fruits of their industry; and
to do justice ....
to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the
acquisitions of their parents; to the nourishment and improvement of their
offspring; to instruction in life, and to consolation in death."'" (Brackets
added)
Burke enumerates other rights and/or duties. He indicates that men
have equal rights to opportunities, but expressly they do not have rights
to "equal things." Stockholders have equal rights to dividends; not to
equal dividends. So it is in the management of the State. All men should
have a voice, but not necessarily an equal voice. "It is a thing to be settled
by convention."
Burke in neither theory nor practice was a democrat. Pares calls him
"the high priest of snobbery." Late in his career (1791) he asserted:
"I see as little of policy or utility, as there is of right, in laying down a
principle that a majority of men told [tolled] by the head are to be considered as the people, and that as such their will is to be the law."8 "
(Brackets added)
The proper arrangement was that "The wiser, the more expert, and
the more opulent conduct, and by conducting enlighten and protect,
the weaker, the less knowing, and the less provided with the goods of
fortune."
Burke then gives an extensive list of elements which go to make
up the natural aristocracy that should rule a society-"and without which
there is no nation." These were views that Burke had indicated the year
before in the Reflections. He had propounded a principle for guidance
that appears to have been a long standing belief of his: "Nothing can
secure a steady and moderate conduct in such assemblies, but that the
body of them should be respectably composed, in point of condition in
life, of permanent property, of education, and of such habits as enlarge
and liberalize the understanding."8"
"Reflections,
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The evidence is clear that Burke considered himself within the definition of a member of this natural aristocracy. In 1774 Burke was forced
to give up his safe seat in Wendover. Some citizens of Bristol asked him
to stand for election to one of the city's two seats. He did so and was
elected.8" On November 3, 1774 he delivered a famous speech to the
electors of Bristol at the conclusion of the poll.8" Burke's fellow member
had undertaken to be bound by the instructions of his constituents. Burke
would not agree to this. A representative ought certainly to give all due
weight to the wishes of his constituents: "But his unbiased opinion, his
mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice
to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not
derive from your pleasure ...They are a trust from Providence, for the
abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you,
not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving
you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion."87
Burke's reasons were cogent for rejecting the concept of mandatory
instructions but they do not conceal his belief in the primacy of his own
judgment.88 His belief that a representative should be guided by the larger
considerations of a vast empire did not sit well with his constituents and
he did not stand for re-election in 1780. " For the remainder of his parliamentary career he sat for the rotten borough of Malton.
Towards the end of the 19th century there entered into political
practice a gradual recognition of the responsibility of the Government
for the well being of all the people of the nation. The emergence of
this belief was but part of a changing ideal of government. Whether
it was brought on by the expansion of the electorate or a new idealism
among men is not relevant to this essay. In our own country, the New
Deal wrought a revolution by legislation. Traditional limitations on
governmental action were completely rejected and the consequence was
a tremendous reworking of our social structure. The modern administrative state would be abhorred by Edmund Burke. These thoughts are
here introduced merely to illustrate the concept of social change. Since
Burke is now so prominent as a guiding spirit of the modern conservatives, it is of some moment to examine his concept of change in society
and government.
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He apparently is mincing no words when he asserts that: "A positively vicious and abusive government ought to be changed,-and, if
necessary, by violence,--if it cannot be (as sometimes it is the case)
reformed."9 And in another place he states that: "A state without the
means of some change is without the means of its conservation."'" This
sentence is frequently alluded to as demonstrating the fact that Burke
recognized the realities of life. But it should be noted that this sentence
follows immediately after a paragraph which very severely limits the
application of the general principle.
In that paragraph, Burke says that "it is far from impossible to
reconcile, if we do not suffer ourselves to be entangled in the mazes of
metaphysic sophistry, the use both of a fixed rule and an occasional
deviation." We can adhere to "the sacredness of an hereditary principle
of succession in our government, with a power of change in its application
in cases of extreme emergency." But, Burke warns, "even in that extremity... the change is to be confined to the peccant part only; . . . and
even then it is to be effected without a decomposition of the whole civil
and political mass, for the purpose of originating a new civil order out
of the first elements of society."
This attitude of Burke's is usually translated to the effect that Burke
was for reform, not innovation; correction, not change. Peter Viereck
quotes Disraeli in a fine passage that I believe is representative of Burke's
views: "In a progressive country change is constant; and the great question
is, not whether you should resist change which is inevitable, but whether
that change should be carried out in deference to manners, the customs,
the laws, the traditions of the people, or in deference to abstract principles
and arbitrary and general doctrines." 2
The principle is a very general one and its application is a challenge.
Burke, of course, is remembered because in the face of a tremendous
upheaval of the French people, Burke could find nothing in their history,
laws, or traditions to justify it. With his concept of society as an organism,
Burke was encouraged to analogize and find physical processes pertinent
to political affairs. The gradualness of natural growth was more congenial to his mind than any abrupt turnabout in human affairs. 8 Cobban
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feels that Burke's theory of progress was similar to Darwin's in that it
was unwilled and irrational. "
It is hard to doubt that Burke found any form of substantial change
difficult to conceive. The copious imagination apparently spent itself in
verbal constructions rather than social reconstruction. As a consequence
Burke has come to represent the arch-conservative, the opponent of
progress. The view of Robert Hutchins has been previously noted that
Burke's final views on the state precluded any modification of existing
social arrangements. The Beards assert that Burke "Appropriated the
word civilization ... and declared himself the champion of civilization
against the vulgar, brutal, and swinish multitude engaged in making the
Revolution in France." And Burke's example was followed.., by many
writers occupied in defending historical conservatism in France, England,
and the United States against the progressive spirit of civilization as it
was affirmed by Condorcet, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine."9
The view that Burke was the great liberal Whig, I believe, must
have its basis, in the United States at least, in the fact that Burke's Speech
on Conciliation (March 22, 1775) is so widely read in our secondary
schools. And the speech probably receives a more liberal interpretation
than it deserves. Cone says: "Burke's bitterness against the ministry and
the generosity of spirit toward the aggrieved Americans obscured the inadequacy of his proposals."9 7 Namier takes the view that: "it seems extremely doubtful whether Burke and his friends, if in power would have
succeeded in saving the First British Empire. Their ideas were no less
hierarchical and authoritarian than those of George III and Lord North,
and, to them, to trade was the soul of Empire; had Burke been in office
during the American Revolution, we might merely have had to antedate
his counter-revolutionary Toryism by some twenty years."98
This is but another facet of the consistency problem we have considered previously. We are not bound by nor really interested in Burke's
judgment on events contemporary to him. It seems certain that Burke's
lasting fame must rest upon the philosophic and moral principles that
were the basis of these judgments. That these types of principles do not
necessarily stand in the way of the advocacy of progressive views on the
social welfare of the great mass of people may readily be demonstrated
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by the rereading of a document published in 1891 on the subject of
The Condition of the Working Classes.
At least one student of Burke has felt that Burke laid down the
foundations for an enlightened Toryism. This doctrine was "one which
trusted not in a priori psychology, rationalist and individualist in the
extreme, but in the empirical study of human nature, and which, while
retaining what was good in the old, adapted itself to the needs of a
new age.""9
This essay has been occupied in the problems that arise in the course
of studying Burke and his period. Aside from a few observations it has
been thought advisable to avoid discussion of such topics as the contemporary significance of Burke or the place of Burke in a conservative
philosophy for today. Much work needs to be done on such matters, but
this work will be done so much the better after a broader understanding
of what Burke did and was trying to do in his own time. To these considerations, I here make only one exception and that deals with the
influence of Burke on the early history of the United States.
The new conservatives appear resolved to make Edmund Burke the
intellectual leader of the American conservatism and they begin with the
Federalists."' The professional historians will have none of it.'0 ' There
is no such tradition as is pointed to by these new conservatvies 2 If
Burke had entered into the thinking of American men in public life, he
would most certainly have been mentioned sometime during the debates
at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. He was not mentioned and
there is no doubt that this is surprising. The speeches at the Convention
show a thorough understanding of the British Constitution. These men
had all arrived at their maturity in time to know about the efforts of
George III and his personal government. They were lawyers trained by
Blackstone and so would be fully exposed to the glories of the British
Constitution-but there still was no word about Burke. 103 Burke had
been known prior to the Revolution as the agent for the New York
0
Colony.1'
His speeches on their behalf in Parliament were known by
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the Colonists. " ' But his much regarded work on the party system was
never, so far as I have discovered, mentioned by any of our early statesmen. His Reflections were read soon after their publication but this
work came too late to influence our early statesmen at the Convention.
Our government was already in being and the conflicting native philosophies were already obvious. John Adams had already set his course and
Burke was not his guide. °8
Earlier in this essay, it has been stated that the intention was to
produce a study of some of the critical and historical problems that arose
when one entered upon a study of Burke. The unity of this effort arises
from this theme even though the discussion may have ranged over diverse
fields of learning. In terms of this entire previous discussion, I shall now
discuss the four books whose recent publication prompted this article.
A Note-Book of Edmund Burke is not an entirely candid title. The
inches in size, was found among the Burke papers so
notebook, 8 x 6
long held by the Fitzwilliam family. This little volume is now among
the other Burke papers on deposit in the Sheffield Library.
The assorted literary items contained in the volume were written
not only by Edmund Burke but by that strange relation, Will Burke.
There are even some pieces to whom the authorship cannot be definitely
attributed to one or the other.
This combined or mixed authorship is not as strange as it may seem.
As Thomas Copeland describes it, Burke "was part of a collective entity
called 'the Burkes.' "" Edmund and his wife, his brother Richard, and
Will Burke, a "cousin," all lived together and dealt with the world as
one. In particular, their financial fortunes rose, and just as often, fell together. When Will was offered a seat in Parliament, he declined it and
requested that it be offered to Edmund who, of course, accepted."°8 This
is family devotion beside which the sharing of a notebook pales.
The Notebook has little intrinsic interest. Its significance lies in the
fact that its contents were composed during the years 1750-55. This
period covers Burke's arrival in London until the publication of the Vindication. Aside from the insights into his mind at the time, these poems
and sketches show that his talents for writing were well developed but
were still in need of exterior polishing. His verbal imagery is showing
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its early bloom and there is little difficulty, for the most part, in recognizing Burke in many of these pieces.
Carl Cone's Burke and the Nature of Politics is one of the two
modern biographies of Burke that have used the papers now at Sheffield."'
Cone is giving us a careful statement of Burke's political career. He makes
definite judgments, but for the most part they are charitable towards
everybody. When the second volume appears, we shall have a first rate
political biography. Cone is not too strong on creating living people.
That task may have to wait until someone else undertakes the task of
weaving Burke into the eighteenth century rather than into the House
of Commons. That will require other volumes by other students but we
can wait. This first volume has no bibliography, but the footnotes suggest that a good part of the text was derived from the original sources.
Charles Parkin's Moral Basis of Burke's PoliticalThought is a wonderfully precise and well-knit analysis of Burke's moral and political
philosophy. Out of almost 500 footnotes, barely more than a dozen
are from works other than Burke's writings. Little effort is made to
place Burke's work in any historical setting with a time and place. His
writings are taken as being of universal application and the effort of
Parkin's essay is directed at setting forth a meaning and weaving a
consistent statement into which assorted stray sentences can be woven.
The thesis of the book is that indicated in the present essay. Starting
with a study of Burke's interpretation of contract theory, the author shows
the place of nature in society and government as Burke views it. The
author then turns his attention to Burke's attitude towards abstract natural rights and the relation of that theory to the French Revolution. The
book closes with a statement of Burke's conception of the moral order
and its religious basis. As stated previously it sounds like Burke and I do
believe it is. The aim was to give meaning to Burke's sentences and this
has been done. No criticism of Burke or his work is advanced. The
effort of the author has been limited to explanation.
Peter Stanlis' Edmund Burke and the Natural Law is a much-needed
survey. Professor Stanlis has covered the existing bibliography on Burke
in English. Here is all that has been discussed in this present essay: the
historical course of natural law, Hobbes divergence, and Burke's reaction.
Then from every corner of Burke's writings are gleaned his references
to natural law. The ground covered in analytical fashion by Parkin is
put in its historical setting by Stanlis. Stanlis has now made a book out
of the chapters and footnotes scattered in assorted places. The concepts
109 The other is Sir Philip Magnus, Edmund Burke (1939).
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discussed are not original contributions as can be seen from this preceding
essay which was constructed from many of the sources used by Stanlis.
But this collecting needed doing and it has now been done handsomely.
On occasion in this essay I have indicated that this was not the place
to consider the current attempts to use Burke for a modern conservative
philosophy. The trouble with such attempts is inherent in Stanlis' book.
This book is single minded in its effort to connect every working moment
of Burke with natural law. When it is admitted that the author has
accomplished his purpose, one may then proceed to ask for more. Since
the book is saturated with an uncritical adoration of its subject, work
remains to be done on Burke and the natural law. What do we take with
us of Burke and the natural law into the twentieth century? Does anyone
seriously believe that a thorough study of Burke will enable one to blast
away Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer? Those who close with the thought
of gentlemen such as these two will do so only in terms of the philosophical analysis of this century. Is there any relation at all between the
twentieth century natural law of, say, Maritain and the natural law of
Burke as described by Stanlis? If so, what is it? The answer to this must
be analytic in terms of epistemology, logical structure, and content. It
will not do to collect excerpts from a score of writers and say that this
shows what natural law is. We have the history down now so let us turn
to the task of thinking out both the content and the place in our life of
a great regulating principle that will preserve the good of our culture
as we progress into a strange new world of the future.

